In Babin Builders & Development, Inc. v. Quinones, Florida’s First DCA held that apportionment of liability on claims asserted in the original complaint does not control an award of attorney’s fees on a third‑party complaint raising separate issues between the third‑party litigants. 402 So. 3d 468, 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025). In Babin Builders, the homeowners sued the general contractor, Babin, for construction defects. Babin then filed third‑party claims against its subcontractors, including A&T Stucco, alleging breach of contract, negligence, indemnification, and building‑code violations.
Following trial, the jury found in favor of the homeowners and awarded damages against Babin. On Babin’s third‑party claims, the trial court entered a directed verdict and final judgment against A&T Stucco for breach of contract and building‑code violations. Although the jury apportioned 60% of the homeowners’ damages to Babin and only 40% to A&T Stucco, Babin obtained a net judgment against A&T Stucco on the third‑party claims. Babin then sought attorney’s fees under the prevailing‑party provision in its contract with A&T Stucco. The trial court denied the request, reasoning that Babin was not the prevailing party because it bore the greater share of fault.
On appeal, the First DCA reversed the trial court’s ruling on attorney’s fees. The court explained that the apportionment of liability on the homeowners’ claims had no bearing on A&T Stucco’s liability under the third‑party complaint. The jury found that A&T Stucco breached its contract with Babin and violated applicable building codes, and it made no finding that Babin contributed to those breaches.
Put simply, although the jury assigned Babin a greater percentage of fault for the homeowners’ damages, that allocation did not control the determination of the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees on the third‑party claims. Because Babin prevailed on the significant issues in its third‑party action, it was entitled to recover attorney’s fees from A&T Stucco.
Ultimately, this decision is significant because it preserves the enforceability of prevailing‑party fee provisions in third‑party contracts, even where fault is apportioned differently on the plaintiff’s claims, a common circumstance in construction defect cases.