On April 29, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff alleging disability and age discrimination against her former employer failed to provide evidence tending to show that her employer’s reasons for terminating her were pretextual. This affirmed the ruling dismissing her claims from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Grey v. Vengroff Williams, Inc., No. 24-14020, 2026 WL 1165777 (11th Cir. Apr. 29, 2026). The Court clarified the relationship between the “convincing mosaic” standard and a plaintiff’s burden to provide evidence that the employer’s reason for termination is pretextual.

Grey was employed as a senior salesperson by Second Look, Inc., a company selling subrogation services, for about two months in 2021. She spent two weeks out of the office with COVID-19 and, toward the end of her probationary period, requested an accommodation for bilateral COVID pneumonia. Second Look granted her request, but terminated her a few days later, citing her difficulty in grasping her job.  Grey subsequently filed suit against Second Look claiming she was discriminated against based on a perceived disability and her age, in violation of the ADA and ADEA.

The District Court granted the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims. On appeal, Grey argued that the District Court erred in finding that she had not established a prima facie case of discrimination, and this led the District Court to incorrectly determine that Second Look did not act with pretext in her firing.

The Eleventh Circuit clarified that disparate treatment claims based on circumstantial evidence should be subjected to the burden-shifting evidentiary framework established in McDonnell Douglas. If a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, they are entitled to review under the convincing mosaic standard. The Court rejected the notion that the pretext prong of McDonnell Douglas is identical to the convincing mosaic standard. Summary judgment should not be granted for failure to demonstrate pretext unless it also reflects a failure to put forward enough evidence for a jury to find for the plaintiff on the ultimate question of discrimination.

The Court clarified that when a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, and the defendant is able to rebut the presumption of illicit intent, then McDonnell Douglas “is no longer relevant,” and the plaintiff can only survive summary judgment if they present a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence. Grey argued the District Court erred by determining she had not made a prima facie case because she had not established pretext. The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that the District Court found she made the prima facie case, but held Grey could not prove pretext in response to Second Look’s reason for her firing. Grey was unable to provide a convincing mosaic of evidence of discriminatory intent.

This case provides an incredibly helpful demonstration of how to proceed through McDonnell Douglas and onto the convincing mosaic standard. This case clarifies the confusion that is commonly caused by the difference between the convincing mosaic standard and the pretextual prong of McDonnell Douglas.