Last month, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment on behalf of an insurer on grounds of untimely notice in A.B. by & through J.B. v. Barrow, No. 24-13138, 2026 WL 40906, — F.4th — (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026).
In 2018, A.B. filed an invasion-of-privacy lawsuit against Barrow related to sexual exploitation occurring in 2013. A.B. contemporaneously litigated a separate lawsuit against Barrow and his wife under the Alabama Fraudulent Transfer Act. Through discovery in the latter, A.B. served a subpoena on Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, Barrow’s insurer, approximately nine months after the lawsuits were filed and requested and received Barrow’s insurance policies.
One policy provided personal umbrella liability coverage for occurrences involving an invasion of privacy rights. A condition precedent of the policy required the insured or “someone on [its] behalf” to provide notice of an occurrence “as soon as reasonably possibly.” The policy also required prompt notice of “legal papers or reports relating to the occurrence when a claim or suit is filed against an insured.” It was undisputed Nationwide received constructive notice of Barrow’s 2013 conduct and the invasion-of-privacy lawsuit through the subpoena in 2018.
Nationwide defended Barrow through the verdict in the invasion-of-privacy suit. The court ruled in A.B.’s favor and awarded a total of $10 million in compensatory and punitive damages. A.B. then sued Barrow and Nationwide under Alabama’s Direct-Action Statute to access the umbrella policy limits. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama determined neither Barrow nor A.B. timely notified it, ruled the fifty-eight-month delay was untimely as a matter of law, and granted summary judgment for Nationwide. It reasoned delays of only four to eight months require a reasonable excuse under Alabama law, and neither Barrow nor A.B. any excuse for Barrow’s delay.
On appeal, the court first evaluated whether the policy permitted A.B. to provide notice on behalf of Barrow under the Policy. The policy did not define “someone on your behalf,” so the court looked to multiple dictionaries before adopting the modern definition of “‘in the interest or for the benefit of’ another, even if those actions were not performed by an ‘agent or representative.’” It rejected Nationwide’s proposed interpretation based on traditional agency principles.
The court held A.B. acted in Barrow’s interest by issuing the subpoena in an effort to trigger coverage and, thus, was permitted under the policy to provide notice. The court observed the outcome would be the same even without the “on your behalf” policy language because the Supreme Court of Alabama has suggested “written notice by an injured party instead of its insured could satisfy the notice requirements” of a policy with language requiring only that notice come from the insured. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Miller, 86 So. 3d 338, 341–42 (Ala. 2011).
The court next considered whether A.B.’s notice was timely. Under Alabama law, “[o]nly two factors are to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a delay in giving notice to the insurer: the length of the delay and the reasons for the delay.” Id. at 342. There is no prejudice requirement. Id. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate “where an insured fails to show a reasonable excuse or the existence of circumstances which would justify a protracted delay.” Id. at 343–44 (citations omitted).
The court correctly observed that whether notice was timely under the policy depended on whether it considered timeliness from A.B. or Barrow’s perspective. If the former, notice would be timely because the clock did not start running until A.B. learned of the policy shortly before issuing the subpoena. If the latter, Barrow’s notice obligation was triggered when he committed the conduct fifty-eight months prior because he is presumed to have knowledge of the policy’s notice requirement.
The Eleventh Circuit confirmed the notice requirement is evaluated from the insured’s perspective. The court observed, “Any other reading would detach the phrase ‘on [his] behalf’ from the policy’s single timing requirement and create two different notice deadlines. It further observed, “Nor can A.B., as a third-party claimant proceeding through Barrow, obtain greater rights under the policy than Barrow himself possessed.” The policy does not permit that result.” Although it acknowledged the significant consequences” for A.B., it agreed with the district court the notice was untimely as a matter of law in the absence of a reasonable excuse.
A.B. not only set a precedent supporting the modern interpretation of the “on behalf of” language in the notice condition, but also affirms Alabama precedent suggesting the court should evaluate the timeliness of notice from the perspective of the insured, not the injured party. The Insurance Coverage Group at LGWM is experienced in navigating these coverage issues and is available to address questions regarding notice issues.