On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court, in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, unanimously held that majority-group plaintiffs are not required to meet a heightened evidentiary standard of showing background circumstances to establish a prima facie case for reverse discrimination. 605 U.S. ___, 145 S.Ct. 1540 (2025).

The plaintiff, Marlean A. Ames (“Ames”), a heterosexual woman, brought a Title VII reverse discrimination claim against her employer, the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“DYS”), alleging sexual-orientation discrimination when she was denied a promotion in favor of a lesbian woman and was demoted in favor of a gay man. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the employer and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

These two Courts relied on the traditional framework for evaluating disparate-treatment claims which rest on circumstantial evidence established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The framework places the initial burden on the complainant to show:

(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.

Both the District and Circuit Court held that Ames failed to establish a prima facie case because she had not made the showing that background circumstances support the suspicion that the Ohio Department of Youth Services discriminates against the majority group. Ames appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to consider whether a heightened evidentiary standard applies to plaintiffs alleging reverse discrimination.

The Supreme Court rejected the heightened evidentiary standard, holding that the text of Title VII “draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. . . Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.” Ames, 145 S.Ct. 1540, 1546 (2025). The Court vacated and remanded the case.

The Ames decision makes clear that Title VII creates no heightened evidentiary standard for majority groups to establish a claim for disparate treatment.  Employers should not expect Title VII to apply differently to employees that are members of majority groups. Employers should remain aware of further developments in this body of law as Justice Clarence Thomas, in his concurrence, suggested that he may be willing to consider overruling the McDonnell framework in the future.